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Introduction
Inflation targeting has recently emerged as a promising framework for monetary policy. It has been adopted, explicitly or implicitly, by a number of central banks worldwide. However, solid evaluations of the performance of inflation targeting compared to alternative monetary regimes are few and contradictory. One reason is the relative short existence of inflation targeting. Another reason, and a major one, is the lack of detailed information on how inflation targeting has impacted on the behavior of wage-and price-setters compared to the impact of alternative monetary policy frameworks in history.
In this study we develop a novel assessment of inflation targeting. We study changes in the length of collective wage agreements in Sweden between 1908 and 2008 to evaluate a variety of policy regimes, including the inflation targeting regime officially in force since the mid-1990s. We use the willingness by private sector agents to commit to long nominal contracts as our assessment criteria for regime performance. In short, a credible commitment to nominal stability on the part of policy makers should be reflected in the behavior of the private sector.
We use a uniquely long and consistent series of the length of new collective wage agreements, which covers the whole industrial sector in Sweden between 1908 and 2007. Such a long series, not available for any other country as far as we know, enables us to analyze the evolution of contract-makers' perception of a variety of policy regimes and in particular to evaluate the current inflation-targeting regime in a secular perspective.
A policy regime is often defined as an equilibrium condition such that agents' decision and expectation rules are consistent with the prevailing policy rule. 1 To our knowledge, existing evaluations of historical policy regimes have used only macroeconomic outcomes and assumed that the agents' decision and expectation rules have been stable during periods within a constant policy regime.
Wage contract length is a direct measure of the design of a decision rule, namely the decision rule for setting wages during the contract period. Shorter contracts imply faster revisions of wages to shocks. We find that length has seldom been constant within policy regimes periods and hence we question the assumption that history can be divided into stable regimes according to policy rules.
A clear exception emerges in our data: the current inflation targeting regime displays long, three-year, non-indexed wage contracts since its beginning. The stability and almost immediate credibility of this regime makes it a success in an historical perspective.
We thus conclude that the inflation targeting regime 1995-2008 stands out as an exceptionally stable policy regime as judged by the willingness of wage contract-makers to repeatedly commit to three-year non-indexed wage agreements. So far, inflation targeting appears to be a success by reducing macroeconomic uncertainty compared to previous regimes adopted in Sweden including the gold standard before and after World War I, the price level targeting of the 1930s, the Bretton Woods period of fixed exchange rates and the full employment standard in the 1970s and 1980s.
We perform the analysis in two steps. In the first inductive step, we use a new test to establish a long-run negative relation between macroeconomic uncertainty and contract length across policy rule periods. In the second deductive step, based on the finding in the first step, we use length as a proxy for uncertainty in the short run. Here, we use qualitative evidence to uncover sources of variation in uncertainty and find that uncertainty over the policy rule is the main source of the short-run variation in contract length. Hence, we conclude that for most of the time policy regimes have been evolving rather than being fully stable or constant over time. At a general level, the evidence supports the Lucas critique, the claim that changes in the policy regime cause changes in private sector decision rules.
Our study is organized as follows. Section II presents the institutional framework and the data. Section III reviews previous work on the relation between contract characteristics and policy rules. Section IV develops a new test of Gray's (1978) contract length hypothesis and presents the evidence in favor of it. Section V, the main section, analyzes the short-run evolution of contract length across monetary regimes to gain insight into transitions between and the credibility of policy rules. Here we focus on a comparison between the inflation targeting of 1995-2008 and earlier regimes. Section VI concludes.
Institutional Background and Data Sources
Collective bargaining began in Sweden in the beginning of the 20 th century and spread quickly. A yearly official publication on collective wage agreements was initiated in 1908, which is the start year of our sample. 2 About 60 percent of all industrial workers were covered by such agreements in 1908 and from the beginning of World War II virtually all of them as shown in figure 1. 1908 -1942 . Source: SOS: Kollektivavtal 1909 -1939 , Sociala meddelanden 1940 -1942 Many of the characteristic features of the of the Swedish labor market were established at an early stage. The organizations were highly centralized and national agreements for whole industries were concluded already before World War I. From 1906 the agreements cover both unionized and non-unionized workers. 3 2 Statens officiella statistik: Kollektivavtal 1908 -1922 , Statens officiella statistik: Arbetsinställelser och kollektivavtal samt förlikningsmännens verksamhet 1923 -1938 , and Sociala meddelanden 1939 -42. 3 Fregert (1994 gives an overview of the development of the Swedish bargaining system and the legal framework pertaining to it.
There are two institutional changes with a potential effect on contract length as described in the next section. First, central wage bargaining for the entire blue-collar sector was introduced in 1952 and ended in 1992. The Swedish Trade Union Federation (LO) and the Swedish Employers' Federation (SAF) set average wage changes, which were incorporated into the national agreements made by the member organizations. After 1992, the majority of agreements have been synchronized with identical length. Second, central inflation indexation agreements between LO and SAF were introduced during World War II and were used intermittently until 1990.
We have used the official sources for the coverage of collective agreements for and the length of new contracts for 1908-1919. The length series after 1919 is constructed from a table in the annual reports of LO (Verksamhetsberättelse till landssekreteriatet) on the number of workers, who have contracts which are known on December 31 to expire in a certain month in the future. 4 For the 1952-1987 period, we have used a publication containing the central wage agreements and after that LO's annual reports. 5 For a full description of the sources and construction of the data, see Fregert (1994: ch. 6) . 4 The reason for using this source is that the official statistics only give the number of new agreements in different length categories between 1908 and 1942, but not the number of workers. The expiration data can be used to construct the length of new contracts, weighted by the number of workers. In practice, there is little difference between the two sources except around 1928, when a few large bargaining areas choose one-year contracts. 5 De centrala överenskommelserna 1952 -1987 , Stockholm: Landsorganisationen, 1988 . Bengt Blomqvist at LO kindly supplied his own data on the decentralized agreements after 1992.
Policy Rules and Endogenous Wage Contracts

Gray's Length Hypothesis
Nominal wage contracts attain macroeconomic significance because they make wages sticky when contracts are less than fully contingent. With perfectly contingent contracts, wages change as they would if they were renegotiated for every shift in the demand and supply for labor (barring risk aversion). Real world wage contracts, however, are typically not contingent at all or contingent only on inflation, which leads to contracts of limited length.
In Gray's (1978) model of contract length, the contract-makers agree to a path of nominal wages over the contract life equal to the path of expected equilibrium nominal wages. Due to shocks to labor demand, nominal and real, the equilibrium nominal wage changes over time. Gray (1978) assumed that the shocks follow random walks. Thus, shocks have permanent effects on the equilibrium wage and the contract wage will be expected to deviate from the equilibrium wage increasingly over the contract life and cause increasing efficiency losses.
The efficiency loss over the contract's life corresponds to the sum over time of the expected dead-weight loss triangles in the labor market caused by the shocks. The expected efficiency loss at the signing of the contract for a future point in time is directly proportional to the expected forecast variance of the wage shock, in turn equal to the forecast horizon times the one-period forecast variance by the random walk assumption. 6 The average efficiency loss per period then increases in direct proportion to contract length and the one-period forecast variance of the shocks.
The trade-off between short contract length, which minimizes the average efficiency loss, and a long contract, which minimizes the per-period cost of an assumed fixed set-up cost, is shown by Gray (1978: eq. B2, p.18) to result in optimal contract length being equal to:
Consequently, length decreases in the variance of the one-period forecast error of the wage shocks with an elasticity of -0.5. The variance is a weighted average of the real and nominal shocks affecting labor demand, with weights depending on the slopes of labor supply and demand schedules. For convenience, we label the variance "macroeconomic uncertainty". Gray (1978) also demonstrated that inflation indexation is a substitute for length reductions, 
Contract Length and the Policy Regime
The optimal length equation (1) does not explicitly refer to the policy regime. The connection has been made in later contributions by considering how the policy rule affects macroeconomic uncertainty. Fischer (1980) and Fethke and Policiano (1981) made the case for stabilization policy in the form of contingent feedback rules based on the policy-makers' information advantage, when contract-makers are precluded from acting on new information because they are bound by contracts. Contingencies in policy rules may be seen as substitutes for using contingencies in contracts as stabilization instruments. More recently Calmfors and Johansson (2006) analyze how shorter contract length and increased indexation may substitute, though imperfectly, for the loss of monetary policy when a country enters into a monetary union. McCallum (1983) made the connection between the number of contingencies of a feedback rule and the length of wage contracts. He suggested that efficient stabilization policy should be regarded as a joint venture between policy-makers and contract-makers, who jointly minimize the costs of stabilization. Since it can be presumed that it is easier for the policymakers to include contingencies in the policy rule than it is for the contract-makers to include them in the wage rule, an efficient stabilization policy should lead to long and non-indexed contracts.
The most efficient policy rule, from the contract-makers' perspective, would be a rule with wage inflation as the target. 8 In contrast, a rule that uses price inflation as the target neutralizes nominal shocks, but lets the contract-makers adjust to supply shocks. 9 Thus, one determinant of length, and likely a major one, is the policy regime through its effect on macroeconomic uncertainty. Macroeconomic uncertainty measures the degree to which exogenous shocks affect the equilibrium wage. Only in the extreme case of perfect wage stabilization would the effect of shocks vanish. Thus variation in length may be due to either changes in the policy regime or in the incidence of exogenous shock variability.
This drawback of using contract length as a policy evaluation measure is shared with other studies evaluating inflation targeting regimes, which adopt what Vega and Winkelried (2005) label an "absolute" approach. Absolute evaluations pit inflation targeting regimes against the previous regime(s). Vega and Winkelreid (2005) instead propose a "relative" approach, as does Lin and Ye (2007) . They control for non-policy determinants of the inflation outcome, by pitting inflation targeters against non-inflation targeters with similar characteristics, using statistical matching methods.
Still, we are of the opinion that length is a useful measure of regime performance, in particular as a complement to other measures. First, length, by virtue of being an uncertainty proxy, is potentially a welfare measure as it reflects the dead-weight loss in the labor market.
There is a long theoretical and empirical line of thought, linking the costs of inflation to its uncertainty, rather than its observed mean and variability, measures commonly used in 8 Among suggested contemporary rules, the nominal GDP rule comes closest to such a rule and, hence, would lead to the longest contracts. 9 Stabilizing nominal wages was suggested by Keynes. Nominal wage and nominal GDP stabilization, and also the so-called inverse productivity rule for prices, are closely related and have a long tradition, see Fregert (1993) and Selgin (1995) . current inflation targeting evaluation studies. Second, our historical and "absolute" approach compares the current inflation targeting regime to seven other regimes, not just the most previous one in time.
Third, we complement the statistical long-run regime comparisons with historical evidence to discuss if the source of perceived macroeconomic uncertainty originated from the regime or from underlying shocks. Specifically, in section 5 we focus on the transitions between regimes, when the regime change may dominate over other influences. Here the yearly length data has a clear advantage over variability measures of inflation and output computed over several years. This seems to be the implicit assumption of Fischer's (1986: footnote 8),
suggestion that changes in contract characteristics should be a good indicator of regime changes.
The Cross-Regime Relation between Uncertainty and Contract Length
Length and indexation of collective wage agreements in the industrial sector are displayed in The following features stand out:
• Contract length varies between a minimum of one and a maximum of four years.
• Contract length displays no trend over time.
• Contract length is sluggish: it increases and decreases over several years.
• Long contracts emerge during the three most stable periods as judged by the standard deviation of wage inflation (see table 1): the classical gold standard 1908-1914, the end of the Bretton Woods period 1966-1974, and the inflation targeting regime 1995-2005.
• The most recent period 1995-2005 is the longest stable period, with four consecutive three-year non-indexed contracts.
• Inflation indexation has been used extensively in the two most volatile periods: World
War II and the 1977-1990 period as judged by the standard deviation of wage or price inflation (see table 1), with the exception of World War I as discussed below.
Thus the data suggest a strong connection between stable regimes and long and non-indexed wage contracts, which we now test. 1976, 1977 (twice), 1981, and 1982. d A low inflation target of 2 percent was declared by the Riksbank in January 1993 to be valid from 1995 after the switch to floating exchange rates in November 1992. e SD = standard deviation; SD rank: from low to high.
Previous tests of Gray's length hypothesis are based on yearly data from the USA and Canada, and employ regressions of new length on estimated ex ante uncertainty measures of CPI-inflation or underlying nominal and real uncertainty. 10 Here we test the hypothesis as a long-run proposition by regressing new length on the ex post nominal wage-inflation variance with observations of averages over the policy rule periods given in table 1. The policy rule periods are defined by reference to the exchange rate arrangement, which closely follow the evolution of the international exchange rate system. In section VI, we present the policy rules in more detail. The test is in the spirit of Lucas's (1980) test of the quantity theory as a longrun proposition using long-run averages of inflation and money growth displayed in scatter diagrams. He demonstrated that the longer the averages, the tighter the quantity theory relation became, as temporary and extraneous influences on inflation were eliminated.
Our test uses the variance of wage-inflation over a longer period as a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. This is a perfect proxy under the assumptions in Gray (1978) , which we demonstrate in three steps. First, the shock variance in Gray's formula is proportional to the forecast variance of the equilibrium nominal wage. This can be seen by recognizing that the exogenous shocks cause efficiency losses, measured by dead-weight triangle areas, which are due to the deviations between the contractual wage (equal to the expected equilibrium wage) and the equilibrium wage. The expected losses (areas) are thus proportional to the square of the expected wage deviation, that is, its variance.
Second, the one-period unconditional wage inflation variance is equal to the one-period forecast variance of the equilibrium nominal wage. In other words, the observed wage inflation one-period variance over a longer period is a perfect proxy of macroeconomic uncertainty. Let τ be contract length, w the actual logarithmic wage, and w eq the equilibrium logarithmic wage. The equilibrium wage level follows a random walk with drift such that: . At renegotiation, the contract wage catches up with the shocks to the equilibrium wage that have occurred since the previous renegotiation:
.
The unconditional one-period variance of actual wage inflation, dw, is the time-weighted average of the one-period variance of wage inflation in: 1) periods between renegotiations (= drift) and 2) periods of renegotiations ( ), such that:
( 2) Thus, the unconditional (long-run) actual wage inflation variance, , is equal to the oneperiod forecast variance of the equilibrium wage level, . Third, over longer periods perceived ex ante uncertainty, which determines contract length, should approach the true uncertainty. Over a longer period we may assume "rational expectations" of second-order moments such that the contract makers' perceived uncertainty matches actual uncertainty. 11 The ex ante forecast variance over equilibrium wages is thus revealed in the long run as the ex post variance of wage inflation. 11 Blanchard (1979) analyzed the transition to second-order rational expectations in a model of endogenous choice of the degree of wage indexation with one-period wage contracts. In his model actual wage variability is a function of the perceived variability and only in the longrun rational expectations equilibrium do they coincide. Here, the equilibrium wage variability is independent of length, as seen by (2), and hence there is no simultaneity between the behavior of the economy and contract length.
In our application, we cannot assume that perceived uncertainty and actual uncertainty have become equal. As pointed out above, contract length has rarely been stable and there appears to be long transition periods between policy rule periods. The wage inflation variance may still be used as a proxy of perceived uncertainty, provided most of the variation in uncertainty across regimes is captured by variation in true uncertainty. The variation in true uncertainty across regimes, captured by the variance of wage inflation, may in turn be due to the inherent differences in policy rules or in the incidence of exogenous shocks.
The estimated regression is:
where the variance of wage inflation for regime i, is a dummy for indexation in regime i (=1 for 1940-1951 and 1974-1992) , is a dummy for central wage bargaining in regime i (=1 for 1952-1973 and 1974-1992) and e the residual. The observations are the period averages given in table 2. Our test amounts to testing the joint hypothesis of: a) the length hypothesis according to (1), and b) the validity of the uncertainty proxy. If the proxy is poor, the length coefficient, β The regression results are given in table 2 with World War I excluded. 12 The estimated elasticity of length with respect to the variance of wage inflation is -0.29, which is statistically significant at the one-percent level. We take this as clear evidence in favor of Gray's hypothesis as a long-run proposition. Taken at face value her functional form is rejected as the estimated elasticity of -0.29 is statistically different from -0.5, but should be interpreted as a higher bound, since the uncertainty proxy is subject to an error-in-variables bias. Previous studies have not tested Gray's prediction of the uncertainty elasticity being -0.5 as they have used linear specifications. We ran the reverse regression with the logarithm of the wage variance as the dependent variable. The estimate is -3.4 (t = 15). Following Leamer and Klepper (1984) , we can be confident that the effect is negative and bounded by these two numbers. In other words, the proxy problem is not so severe as to overturn the negative relation.
The statistically significant negative effect of centralization on length is opposite the expected positive sign. One interpretation is that centralization decreased total negotiation costs in Sweden due to the existence of the central organizations LO and SAF, which could negotiate for their members without significant increases in coordination costs. Finally, inflation indexation did not significantly increase length as expected.
Taken together, we believe the graphical and statistical evidence provide strong evidence in favor of Gray's length hypothesis. 12 World War I is a clear outlier as seen in figure 3. Wage and price inflation variability changed drastically from the previous stable Classical Gold Standard to the most volatile period in the 20 th century. Contract-makers who had just begun to use collective agreements were faced with a massive change in macroeconomic uncertainty beyond their previous experience. Contract-makers took their time to catch up to the new policy rule during World War I as further discussed in section 5. . 0 2 = R N = 7 ** significant at the 1 percent level.
Note: The data on length and wage inflation are given in Table 1 . The CPI-index dummy is 1 in the 1940-1952 and 1972-1992 1908-13 1993-2007 1953-71 1972-92 1940-1952 1932-39 1923-31 1914-1922 0,0 0,5 
The Within-Regime Relation between Uncertainty and Contract Length
The finding that average new contract length across regimes can be explained by macroeconomic uncertainty leads us to use contract length as an indicator of uncertainty also within regimes. Thus, we take changes in contract length from year to year to reflect changes in perceived uncertainty. We use qualitative evidence from contemporary sources to find the source of this variation in uncertainty within regimes. Most of the variation, we find, is due to changes in credibility of the regime. These changes may, but need not, materialize as increased variability. Consequently, changes in credibility are difficult to capture with any quantitative measure, including previously used ex ante measures. Specifically, we identify some periods as mutual learning processes of "confidence building" or "confidence destruction". We also identify the sources of some changes due to perceived real shock uncertainty. For each policy rule period listed in table 1, we first describe the policy regime and then the evolution of contract length and indexation. The interwar gold standard [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] . Sweden returned to gold at the old parity, de facto in 1922 by fixing the krona-dollar exchange rate through intervention -the first country in Europe to do so -and de jure in 1924. The return to the old gold parity through a costly deflation illustrates the power that the gold standard rule exercised over monetary thinking.
17 See Fregert and Jonung (2004) for a detailed analysis of policy-and contract-makers' reactions during the deflations of 1921-22 and 1931-33. 18 Generally it was the employers who refused new agreements. According to the Annual Report of SAF (Verksamhetsberättelse (1921, pp 18-19) ), SAF desired collective agreement, but "where this has not been possible to achieve reasonable terms, one has used the alternative of working without an agreement." This indicates a strong, but not unconditional support for collective agreements.
There was a widespread belief among economists, politicians and the general public that once the gold standard had been reintroduced, it would create stability and economic growth, as it had before the war.
And indeed after the return to gold in 1922, the Swedish price level did quickly stabilize to a path of slow deflation for the rest of the decade, while uncertainty declined. This process was reflected in a gradual increase in contract length from one year in 1922 to two years in 1927.
However, contract length did not return to the pre-1914 level, which suggests that the interwar gold standard never achieved the credibility held by the prewar gold standard. Its limited credibility may be explained by the fact that the international gold standard never was fully restored. The attempts to re-establish it through international conferences and the associated negotiations over war reparation were closely followed by the labor market parties.
The uncertainty over the future of the international monetary system is clearly seen in the annual reports of the central labor market organizations, LO and SAF, and in their journals.
The slow deflation during the 1920s raised real wages without the need for renegotiation.
Wage contracts were simply prolonged to an increasing degree with no changes in the wage.
In 1929, 30 percent of all agreements were prolonged. All collective agreements contained automatic prolongation clauses which extended the terms for one year if no party gave notice.
Thus the 1920s policy rule effectively turned into a wage stabilization standard, but with considerable ex ante uncertainty which did not materialize ex post.
Contract length declined between 1928 and 1932 due to increasing uncertainty about the future. 19 In the fall of 1930, SAF "urged great caution" and recommended that no member should enter into collective agreements longer than a year owing to the unusually large After 1931, two-year contracts came back and were in the majority until 1937. The length of contracts then decreased in 1938, for two reasons. Firstly, strains between the fixed exchange rate, pegged in 1933, and the domestic price stabilization goal appeared in 1936 when the 19 The decline in contract length in 1928 may be explained by uncertainty caused by a new labor tribunal created to handle new labor legislation, including the first regulation of collective agreements. There was also an unusually large number of labor conflicts as well as a contested election, all contributing to uncertainty and the decrease in contract length in 1928. 20 The Riksbank asked three prominent economists to give advice on the new monetary regime. Some questions dealt with the problem of establishing the new regime. The economists' answers can be interpreted as a contribution to the present debate on changes in the monetary regime and inflation targeting. See Jonung (1979) and Berg and Jonung (1999) .
British price level began to increase and calls for an appreciation went unheeded (Jonung and Berg 1999, p. 544) . Secondly, growing fears of a new war further increased uncertainty.
Paper standard in a controlled economy [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] . Contract-and policy-makers were much better prepared for World II than for World War I. The outcome was also considerably more stable, as seen in table 1, 1940) . 24 The intended degree of compensation was about 75 percent, but the actual compensation only came to about 43 percent due to lagged adjustment. SAF, who initially opposed indexation, accepted it because of the stipulation of a minimum length.
The initial high degree of indexation indicated a belief that shocks were mainly to be nominal, testifying to a low belief in the government's declared policy rule. Ex post, macroeconomic developments during World War II turned out to be different from developments during World War I. In particular, War II experienced a larger negative supply shock ingredient.
Effective blockades and the closeness of fighting, with Denmark and Norway occupied by German forces and Finland attacked by the Soviet Union, reduced international trade and raised the prices of imports. Erik Lindahl (1943) estimated that of the total price increase of 50 percent between 1939 and 1943, 20 percent was due to "scarcity inflation". 25 The indexation agreements were changed to a lower effective degree in the subsequent agreements of 1941, 1942 and 1943 1966-1969 and 1971-1973 .
The internal policy rules developed gradually to cope with the requirements of the dollargold-based Bretton Woods system. The restrictions on domestic fiscal and monetary policy were tighter than under the previous gold standards due to the combination of a fixed exchange rate and the implicit ban on international borrowing. Since no international borrowing was possible, the current account could only remain negative for as long as the foreign exchange reserves lasted. Barring devaluation of the currency, which was never contemplated in Sweden as it was in the UK in 1967, demand growth had to be managed so as not to outstrip growth in real output.
The international To sum up, the parallelism between growth in credibility, evolution of the policy framework and collective agreement design indicates that the Bretton Woods period was not a stable equilibrium regime. Its zenith, from 1966 to 1971, was a short one.
Full employment standard [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] . The international fixed exchange rate system collapsed in the early 1970s. Following the first oil price shock of the 1970s (OPEC I), the prime goal of Swedish stabilization policy was to maintain full employment by accommodation, at the expense of exchange rate stability and low inflation. Sweden was a member of the European exchange rate agreement "the European snake" between 1973 and 1977. This policy resulted in several devaluations (in 1976, twice in 1977, 1981, 1982 and the collapse of the fixed exchange rate in 1992) and a considerably higher rate of inflation in Sweden than in most other OECD countries, but also in lower unemployment rates. The policy rule from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s should be characterized as a full employment policy rule accompanied by a wage-price spiral caused by the use of devaluations to accommodate wage increases. 28
The fall of the fixed exchange standard and rising uncertainty about future inflation contributed to a shortening of contract length and a return of indexation. Two-year agreements were concluded for 1975-1976, 1978-1979, 1981-1982 and 1984-1985 In the mid-1980s, when the public as well as the government had gradually learnt the costs and consequences of accommodation, several economists began to argue for a return to a nonaccommodation policy rule using the fixed exchange rates as an irrevocable nominal anchor. 29 Policy shifted in the early 1990s to non-accommodation which, in combination with an international recession and an overvalued currency led Sweden into its worst post-war crisis with unemployment exceeding ten percent. In November 1992, the Riksbank was forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate after a period of speculative attacks. targeting 1993-2007 . In January 1993, shortly after the switch to a floating exchange rate rule in the fall of 1992, the Riksbank board declared an explicit low inflation target (2 % ± 1%) to be enforced from January 1995. The speed of the transition to this new regime of low inflation is without parallel as judged by the contract-makers choice of first non-indexed two-year contracts in 1993 and then three-year contracts in 1995 and thereafter. The present regime of inflation targeting is also the longest period of high credibility in the 100 years we study. It should be added, that the Riksbank has declared that it follows a so-called flexible inflation targeting regime, that is, it allows supply shocks to affect the inflation rate in the short run, to limit fluctuations in the output gap; a regime close to a nominal income stabilization regime.
Inflation
During the 1990s, Sweden, like many other countries, underwent major institutional changes.
Fiscal policy has followed a new budget law with strict pre-announced spending limits since 1996. The Riksbank was made independent in 1999. In addition, Sweden has followed the Maastricht criteria, while staying out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and deciding in a referendum in 2003 with a 56 percent no-vote not to join the euro area. The high credibility,
as judged by the first three-year agreement in 1995, was established before these institutional changes.
Our comparison of the behaviour of wage-setters across the wide variety of regimes adopted by Sweden 1908-2008 demonstrates clearly that the inflation targeting regime is associated with less macroeconomic uncertainty than any other regime. In this sense, it stands out as a successful regime. Of course, there is no guarantee that inflation targeting will remain associated with long-term contracts but so far this has been the case.
The international debate on the macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting has not been decisive. No consensus has emerged yet. There are basically two positions, one being critical of inflation targeting as being a form of monetary policy window dressing, without any significant beneficial impact on macroeconomic outcomes; the other being positive towards inflation targeting, suggesting that it has contributed to lower inflation than otherwise. There are several reasons for this inconclusiveness. One is, of course, that inflation targeting has been adopted for a fairly short period of time. We simply lack enough observations. The other reason is that low inflation has characterized the world economy since the adoption of inflation targeting in the early 1990s, thus making it difficult to identify the impact of inflation targeting in cross section studies involving targeters and non-targeters. 30 We believe that the approach in this study, resting on data for a very long period, and thus from a variety 30 The positive case for inflation targeting is given for example in Bernanke et al (1999) , Leiderman and Svensson (1995) and Truman (2003) and the negative by Friedman (2004) . The empirical evaluations comparing inflation targeters to others during the last 15 years point in different directions. Vega and Winkelried (2005) find a significant effect on the inflation outcome of inflation targeting, while Ball and Sheridan (2005) and Lin and Ye (2007) cannot find a significant effect. A different approach is taken by Mihov and Rose (2008) who compare the duration of inflation targeters to fixed exchange rate regimes. They find that inflation targeting regimes have lasted longer and with a better inflation outcome than the control group as is true for Sweden when we compare the inflation targeting regime to all the previous regimes in last 100 years. of monetary regimes, and focused on the behaviour of private-sector agents is a way of circumventing the weaknesses of cross-section studies dealing with inflation outcomes -the standard approach taken in the literature on evaluating inflation targeting.
Conclusions
We have explored a unique data set on wage contract length to evaluate all the policy rules in Sweden during the past 100 years, including the most recent one of inflation targeting adopted in the early 1990s. On the basis of both long-run quantitative and short-run qualitative evidence, we conclude that wage contract length can serve as an excellent measure of the contract-makers' perception of regime credibility and regime stability.
As judged by the contract makers' willingness to make long nominal wage commitments, most of the policy regimes during the 20th century have met little success until the advent of the current inflation targeting regime. The classical gold standard and the late Bretton Woods period also saw long non-indexed contracts, but not for extended periods. Three periods can be characterized as unstable in relation to the other regimes: the 1940s, the 1970s, and the 1980s. Three periods are gradual transition periods: from high to low credibility (the 1910s) and from low to high credibility (the 1920s and the 1950s). The 1930s price stabilization rule is difficult to characterize, but should perhaps be labeled a semi-stable regime. The inflation targeting regime after 1995 with three-year non-indexed contract stands out in a secular perspective both for its instant credibility and for its long duration. We thus conclude: inflation targeting is a success in Sweden, so far.
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